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Abstract
User fees were introduced in public health facilities in Cambodia in 1997 in order to inject funds
into the health system to enhance the quality of services. Because of inadequate health insurance,
a social safety net scheme was introduced to ensure that all people were able to attend the health
facilities. However, continuing high rates of hospitalization and mortality from dengue fever among
infants and children reflect the difficulties that women continue to face in finding sufficient cash in
cases of medical emergency, resulting in delays in diagnosis and treatment. In this article, drawing
on in-depth interviews conducted with mothers of children infected with dengue in eastern
Cambodia, we illustrate the profound economic consequences for households when a child is ill.
The direct costs for health care and medical services, and added indirect costs, deterred poor
women from presenting with sick children. Those who eventually sought care often had to finance
health spending through out-of-pocket payments and loans, or sold property, goods or labour to
meet the costs. Costs were often catastrophic, exacerbating the extreme poverty of those least
able to afford it.
Background
Resource-poor countries have long struggled to control
infectious disease, reduce mortality and severe morbidity,
and improve childhood survival rates with inadequate
resources that are echoed in delayed diagnosis and poor
service delivery at local levels. From the 1980s, various
financing systems have been introduced to supplement
government budgetary allocations, loans and bilateral
aid, to deter the unnecessary use of health services, and
from 1988, to improve access to and quality of services.
The Bamako Initiative in particular emphasised the intro-
duction of user fees, specifically to supplement the budg-
ets of local health facilities, meeting salary and supply
shortfalls, and so improve access and quality.
In an review published a decade ago, still apposite, Gilson
notes the lack of attention to the ability of poor house-
holds to pay fees, and the effects of user fees on health
seeking and treatment [1]. Subsequent studies in low and
middle-income countries on the relationship between
user fees and the utilization of public health services sup-
port claims that direct costs discourage presentation by
poor people [2-5]. In Ghana, user fees have been shown
to discourage presentation for antenatal and midwifery
care, and consequently contribute to continued high
maternal and neonatal mortality [6]. In Tanzania, despite
general willingness to pay when quality of care at lower-
level health facilities was improved, the very poor, women
and elderly were negatively affected [7]; in Niger, user fees
also resulted in declining patients' attendance and varia-
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ble cost recovery [8]. The current view therefore is that
minimally, there need to be effective safety nets for poor
and vulnerable households, with alternative approaches
to user fees such as micro-health insurance and/or exemp-
tions and waivers from cost sharing [7,9,10].
These studies, like those cited by Gilson [1,11], have
largely been conducted in Africa. Yet despite the local
impact of the Bamako Initiative (1988), health financing
reforms to supplement government funds have been
introduced far more extensively. One study in Laos pro-
duced similar results to the African studies, drawing atten-
tion to the negative impact of user fees on the very poor
[12], but relatively little research has been conducted in
Asia on user fees and health seeking behaviour. This is
particularly important when early diagnosis and treat-
ment is critical for individual outcomes and where
prompt medical care is a cornerstone of control. This is
the case for various infections, including acute respiratory
infection, tuberculosis, malaria, and dengue fever, which
predominate in resource-poor settings.
Appropriate funding mechanisms are necessary to ensure
equitable access to health care. The costs of health care to
consumers, and the sources from which money is derived
to pay for health care, are therefore important from a pol-
icy perspective, because the health care system in Cambo-
dia is heavily based on fees. In Cambodia, user fees were
introduced in 1997 as a component of a broader suite of
health care reforms introduced to generate cash to supple-
ment the basic low salaries of health staff, so to motivate
staff and discourage them from seeking unofficial pay-
ments from patients or undertaking extra jobs during offi-
cial working time. Cash generated from user fees was also
expected to contribute to the operational costs of health
facilities, so improving the quality of health care. To
ensure that the reforms would not prevent poor people
from using government health facilities, the Ministry of
Health gave local health workers discretionary power to
provide partial or full fee-exemptions for health care to
people deemed particularly vulnerable [13]. The impact
of this on service use appears to be uncertain. In 2006,
18%, 16% and 9% of people received user-fee exemptions
from health centres, provincial referral hospitals and
national hospitals respectively [14]. Attendance at public
hospitals appears to have increased, but this may be not
only because official hospital fees are lower than those
charged by local private health practices, but also because
they are lower than the informal fees still charged by gov-
ernment health workers, including for drugs and other
supplies not available at the facilities [15-18].
A particular risk for people living in poverty, for whom
health expenditure can be catastrophic, is that health may
be traded off against other immediate needs. Because of
the vulnerability of very poor householders, in 2000, in
conjunction with development partners, the Cambodian
Government introduced two types of social safety nets: a
health equity fund and a community-based health insur-
ance scheme. Currently, the health equity scheme covers
35 of 73 operational districts nationwide, and provides
funds to cover the user fees of people who are defined as
poor by subjective assessment. The community-based
health insurance scheme has been piloted in parts of the
country by local non-government organizations. The aver-
age premium is around US$5 per family per annum, and
is used to pay for public health care services at health cen-
tres and referral hospitals. There are no schemes that cover
fees at private health care centres, although regardless of
financial status, many Cambodians use these preferen-
tially.
The Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey in 2005
[19] indicated that the direct costs of treatment were high.
The calculations, including transportation, food, medica-
tion, and administrative, pathology and other fees, indi-
cate that the average cost of a single illness episode was
US$15.52 for public facilities, US$18.62 for private serv-
ices, and US$6.25 for non-medical services (e.g. purchas-
ing local drugs and/or visiting shamans, fortune tellers,
Buddhist monks and traditional healers). There were
small disparities in the sources of money spent on health
care by provider. Although coverage through the health
equity fund or community-based health insurance helped
some people, still there were substantial demands on peo-
ple related to health seeking from both the public and pri-
vate sectors and including non-medical expenses. These
cash demands were covered variously by wages or earn-
ings from casual and informal activities (42% to 65%),
and by savings (20% to 32%) and loans (14%).
Other studies support these findings of the extent of out-
of-pocket expenses. In India and Vietnam, people simi-
larly used cash reserves to meet most health care costs
[20,21]. In Kampong Cham (KPC), eastern Cambodia,
people spent an average of US$11.87, with 39.1% of the
expenses met by wages and other cash resources, 39.6%
from savings, 13.3% from formal loans and 7.8% from
friends [19]. This is the area in which this study was con-
ducted. This article draws on data collected as part of an
ethnographic study of social aspects of dengue fever (DF),
which remains one of the top 10 reasons for hospitaliza-
tion in the country, and an important cause of child mor-
tality. Prevention and control activities for the disease are
conducted by the National Dengue Control Program
(NDCP), under the management of the National Malaria
Centre of the Ministry of Health. The NCDP is responsible
for planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating
dengue control activities nationally, although at the Oper-
ational Health District and Health Centre (village) levels,International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:10 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/10
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dengue control is integrated into a "package" of commu-
nicable diseases, including malaria and schistosomiasis.
We have described prevention and control activities else-
where [22,23]; here, our focus is on the costs of care and
the effect this has on the ability of villagers to respond to
episodes of illness.
Methods
The research on which this article draws was conducted
over eleven months (March 2003 – February 2004) in two
villages of KPC, which we refer to as Khun and Nekry and
which had populations of 1195 and 615 people respec-
tively. These villages were purposively selected because of
the consistent high prevalence of DF, despite their inclu-
sion as NDCP operational areas for Abate (temephos) dis-
tribution and health education campaigns, and despite
the presence of village health volunteers and the inclusion
of dengue prevention in the school curriculum. Each vil-
lage had a public health centre, private health practition-
ers and traditional healers; each village also was located
(in opposite directions) approximately 30 km from the
provincial capital and referral hospital, accessible by buses
and motor bike taxi (motor dup).
Data were collected by the first author using both qualita-
tive and quantitative methods. In order to explore govern-
ment activities to control DF, these methods included
participation in a government workshop on dengue distri-
bution in provinces which had a high prevalence of DF,
document analysis, interviews with policy-makers, health
administrators, and service providers at national, provin-
cial and district levels, and the observation of health edu-
cation, Abate distribution, and routine health clinics. Key
informant interviews were conducted with village health
volunteers and other community members about com-
mon health problems, health seeking behaviours, and the
costs of medical treatment. Focus group discussions were
conducted with mothers of children infected with dengue
on health seeking behaviours and cost of treatment. In-
depth interviews were also conducted with all but two
women whose children had been infected in the past year
or during the research period (N = 29) about their patterns
of seeking treatment of dengue fever, medical treatment at
both private and public health facilities, financial sources,
ability to pay for health care, and their attitudes to user
fees charged at government health facilities. These data
were supplemented by village maps, field notes, the anal-
ysis of health educational material on DF produced by
NGOs and the National Dengue Control Program, a
school survey undertaken in the primary schools in both
villages, and by entomological surveys to identify Aedes
mosquito breeding sites, larval density and village prac-
tices regarding water containers and hard waste disposal
[22-24].
In this article, we focus on data generated from interviews
with women who had children who had been sick from
DF (N = 28), with one woman who had lost three of her
five children from dengue shock syndrome, and with
managers and staff at village health centres, and provin-
cial and national levels (N = 15). With verbal permission,
interviews were tape-recorded. Field notes were written up
as soon as possible after interviews or group discussions,
and subsequently all recorded materials were transcribed
and translated into English. Coding was undertaken with
attention to chronology and diversity of actors and trig-
gers to action in the narrative analysis of individual
accounts, and to identify shared themes, commonalities
and diversity of opinion across interviews and in relation
to other data sources. SPSS version 11.0 was used to man-
age and analyse quantitative data from interviews and
household surveys, the entomological surveys, school sur-
vey and observational checklists. Ethics approval was pro-
vided by the Human Research Ethics Committee of The
University of Melbourne, the Ethics Committee of WHO/
TDR, and the National Ethics Committee of the Ministry
of Health, Cambodia. In this article, we attribute state-
ments by context (interview = Int; focus group discussion
= FGD) and have assigned a number to each participant.
Results
We begin with the one woman who had lost three of her
five children to fever, possibly dengue. She was vague
about the cause of death in all cases because, she said, she
"knew nothing," but she was clear about the role of pov-
erty in their deaths:
At the beginning, she (her first daughter) had a mild fever.
I didn't know what I was; I didn't know that it was dengue
(krun chiem). I bought para (Paracetamol) for her, then
I felt her – she was cold and it was already the second or
third day and she couldn't talk. So then I took her to the
health centre and told them about her condition and that
she was always sleeping. They gave me enough tablets for a
day. The next day she became worse and was always sleep-
ing. I couldn't take her for a blood test and I didn't know
what to do. I bought medicine locally and I kept her until
she died. At the time, I had no money. I couldn't do any-
thing although I thought of everything (to work out what to
do). My daughter was dead ... this is because I had no
money. When there is no money, people can't do any-
thing... money is needed for everything.... The same thing
happened with my second child, maybe due to dengue ... he
seemed to have a mild fever but then the blood cells erupted
and the doctor couldn't give him an injection, and he died
too ... (the next one) was six months old and had cold
extremities. I didn't know if it was dengue. But when she
had fever, I ran for help everywhere in the village and they
told me to take her to the doctor. But I didn't take her to theInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:10 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/10
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hospital. I didn't have the money to pay up front at the pro-
vincial hospital (Int 22)
In 2004, when the field research was drawing to an end,
an estimated 35% of the population of Cambodia (of c.
14 million) were living below the poverty line, defined as
US$0.50 and US$0.45 per capita per day in urban and
rural areas respectively [14]. Around 90% of this popula-
tion lived in rural areas where income generation was pre-
carious, because of changes in land tenure, increasing
indebtedness and landlessness, lack of irrigation facilities,
poor harvests, few alternative sources of employment, and
limited access to markets. Those engaged in subsistence
production often lacked cash for everyday expenses:
school fees, transport, clothing, fuel for cooking and the
purchase of foodstuffs not produced locally, as well as
health care and medical provisions. As we illustrate
below, the high costs of health care and medical services
often exacerbated the poverty of those least able to
afford it.
Expenditure on health care for dengue fever
Our focus on dengue fever as an instance of health
expenditure derives from its prevalence. In 2003, when
the study commenced, DF, DHF (dengue hemorrhagic
fever) and DSS (dengue shock syndrome) were among the
top causes of morbidity and mortality in Cambodia. In
the first eight months of 2007, as we revisited this data,
Cambodia was experiencing the most dramatic outbreak
of the disease in recent years: nationwide, there had been
34,542 cases and 365 deaths from DF, DHF and DSS; in
KPC there were 5105 cases of the disease and 65 deaths
[25]. Control of dengue, and reduced severe morbidity
and mortality, depend on the early recognition of signs of
disease, prompt presentation for diagnosis, and appropri-
ate medical care. We have illustrated elsewhere that delays
were often substantial [24]. As we describe below, these
delays are at least partly due to the lack of available cash
in the event of illness.
During the study period (2003–2004), the severity of den-
gue fever when the child was brought to a provider deter-
mined the length of hospitalization, treatment
procedures, amount of and kinds of medicine, and there-
fore the total cost of care. Regardless of whether they used
a public or private facility, villagers reported spending on
average US$34.50 and up to US$150 for a single episode
of dengue, with those not granted a fee exemption spend-
ing a mean of US$49.29 (range US$25–150) at a public
facility and a mean expenditure of US$34.60 (range
US$8.75–50.00) at a private practice. This amount related
to direct and immediate indirect expenses including med-
ical advice, medication, and travel and food for health
care outside their villages, although not indirect costs such
as loss of income. Only two of eight women who took
their children to the referral hospital in KPC received
exemptions from paying the user-fee. For example, one
woman in Khun village spent approximately US$30 when
her child was admitted to the public children's hospital in
KPC for suspected DF in 2003; during three days of admis-
sion in the facility, she spent US$6 for the bed fee and
serum, US$6 for drugs and syringes which were unavaila-
ble in the hospital, US$10 for ice to cool the child and for
food for the child and other family members, and around
US$8 for motorbike transportation to and from the town.
Another woman who took her child to the provincial
referral hospital spent less than others only because her
child stayed in the hospital for a relatively short period
and she received partial exemption, paying US$5 instead
of the scheduled fee of US$10 to US$25 depending on
services: "I had no money to buy food; I spent it all on serum
that I bought myself and the doctor only did the perfusions. I
bought injections and syringes. I had no money for a bed fee. I
had to tell my mother to stay and look after my child in the hos-
pital and I came back to find (borrow) money" (Int 20).
These costs are exceptionally high, and catastrophic in
rural Cambodia. In Khun and Nekry villages in 2003–4,
the mean income was estimated as exactly on the poverty
line (of US$13.50 per month), and so significant numbers
of people were living on less. But at the same time, the
cost per illness episode could be exorbitant. Without fee-
exemptions, at public facilities, villagers reported spend-
ing on average US$49.29 (range US$ 25–150) and at pri-
vate practices, on average US$34.60 (US$ 8.75–50). These
estimated costs include a consultation fee and medicine,
and transport and food when health care was sought out-
side of the village (see Table 1).
Most residents in the villages and surrounding areas were
farmers, supplementing income from rice with the sale of
other agricultural and horticultural products, the occa-
sional sale of livestock, and the occasional resale of non-
food goods purchased in larger quantities from KPC or
Phnom Penh. As illustrated in Table 1, in both Khun and
Nekry, the main source of money to meet health costs was
loans and the sale of property, goods and labour. Of the
12 women who specified the source of money to meet
medical and related costs, the majority (8/12) received
loans from their neighbours or a local money lender,
depositing property, farm land or cattle as security. Loans
tended to be free of interest if under US$25, provided they
were to be repaid within days. If the amount was greater
and the repayment period extended, villagers paid interest
at rates of 15–20% per month. Many villagers could not
afford to repay the loan and interest, and simply contin-
ued to pay accruing interest at an annual rate of 180–
240%. The high interest payments whittled away any cash
that came to hand, and the continued depletion of mate-
rial resources. Villagers could not repay both interest andInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:10 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/10
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capital without selling assets such as their farmland, cattle
or house. One woman, working as a casual labourer for
around 4000 riels (c.US$1) a day in the rainy season, and
selling firewood for 500 riels ($0.13) a bundle, explained
how she pawned her farmland for five chi (gold measure-
ment, 1 chi = US$35 in 2003) to pay for the medical costs
for her daughter, spending all her money on food, medi-
cal treatment and transportation. Another woman, who
had taken her child to the provincial hospital, recalled:
The dengue fever was severe on the fourth day, and they
wouldn't let me take him home. I had no money, so I depos-
ited land for a loan to pay for food, medicine and other
expenses. So now I have no land and I have to do other
things to earn money to buy rice for my children. If I earn
2000 riels, I spend 2000 riels; if I earn 3000 riels, I spend
3000 riels (Int 5).
Health workers also reflected that "money was a problem
during dengue outbreaks:"
The family took the child to hospital. The wife had to come
home for money, and the husband could not make enough
money from carting water to sell to other villagers, so it was
very difficult for them. The farming was not fruitful, they
did not want to go to the doctor, they tried to do whatever
they could, and they hoped that it would get better. But it's
just too difficult for the poor ... They committed suicide
(FGD 30).
User-fee exemptions
User fees are set, in theory, on the basis of consultations
among HC staff and community members, with approval
from senior staff of the district hospital and provincial
health department. National policy specifies that one per-
cent of the total revenue collected is to be remitted to the
Ministry of Finance, 49% is to supplement the running
costs of the health facility receiving the fees, and the
remaining 50% is to supplement staff salaries as motiva-
tion. The rates are displayed on a board hanging at the
entrance of each building, and vary from US$0.25 cents
for a consultation to US$3.75 for a normal delivery. In
both Khun and Nekry HCs, the revenue approximately
US$60 was raised from fees each month, resulting in each
staff member receiving a supplement of US$5 a month to
their official monthly salary of US$10–15. In the referral
hospital in the provincial capital, the fee ranged from
US$2.5 for administration and consultation to US$50 for
surgery. Staff members received approximately US$25
monthly from the fees supplement their monthly salary of
US$20 – 35, although this still fell short of the amount
needed to meet basic living expenses and was often less
than the cost of a single visit to a hospital for medical
advice and treatment. In the study villages, health workers
estimated that they needed around US$150 per month for
food, clothes and medical costs for a family of five; in
KPC, around US$200 per month. Consequently, health
workers continued to accepting informal payments from
patients at the government clinic or took on additional
jobs: opening a private health practice at home; farming;
or operating a motor taxi (rot motor dup).
Table 1: Expenditure and sources of money for treatment of children with DF
Place of health facilities Expenditure Period of illness Sources of money
Public facilities
Referral Hospital US$25 1 episode Savings, loan from mother
Combined private and public facility
Local private practice, referral hospital US$150 1 episode Sale of rice
Local private practice, referral hospital US$62.50 1 episode Loan,* sold farm land
Local drugs, HC, referral hospital US$37.50 1 episode Pawn farm land for 3 years
Local drugs, referral hospital US$37.50 1 episode Not specified
Local private practice, referral hospital US$31.25 1 episode Loan
Local drugs, referral hospital US$25 1 episode Loan, sale of a pig fee-exemption
Local private practice, referral hospital US$3.75 1 episode Fee-exemption
Private Practices
Local drugs, private practice, blood test US$100 2 sons, 2 episodes Sale of farm land
Local drugs, local private practice US$50 1 episode Sale and loan*
Local drugs, private practices in the village and in KPC US$50 1 episode Not specified
Local drugs, private practice US$45 2 sons, 2 episodes Sale of an ox
Local drugs and private practice in KPC USS37.50 1 episode Sale of a pig
Local drugs, private practice, blood test US$37.50 1 episode Not specified
Local drugs, private practice, blood test US$36.25 1 episode Loan from mother
Local drugs, local private practice US$25 1 episode Loan
Local drugs, local private practice US$25 1 episode Sale of an ox
Local drugs, local private practice US$ 8.75 1 episode Savings, loan from mother
* Loan for more than a year, the exchange rate was 4000 riels = USD 1 at the time of the study in 2003.International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:10 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/10
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Although user fees only partially met the shortfall
between salaries and living costs, they were important to
health workers. While in theory exemptions were granted
on the basis of poverty reported by fellow community
members, exemptions were relatively arbitrary and tended
to be granted by sympathetic health workers who knew of
specific circumstances or in response to personal appear-
ance indicating abject poverty. Students, monks, village
health volunteers and village development committee
members were also granted exemptions from the user-fee.
In 2003, the annual exemption rate at HC of Nekry and
Khun was 26.34% and 42.82% respectively, indicating
that a significant number of people were receiving exemp-
tions from fee payments at the village level, in contrast to
the referral hospital in KPC, where the annual exemption
rate was 16.71% [26] (and even this compared well with
the exemption rate of the National Maternal and Child
Health Care in Phnom Penh of 4–7%). An exemption
constituted lost income for the health facility and for staff,
and should have been covered by the central government
or an NGO. However, in 2003 fees were not reimbursed
either to the HCs or the referral hospital in KPC.
While exemptions in Khun and Nekry were comparatively
high, many extremely poor villagers still had to pay user
fees, and according to participants in focus group discus-
sions and in-depth interviews, user fees were a major
obstacle for the very poor to seek health care at a public
facility. Care at the government HC required up front pay-
ment if they were not granted exemption, but many peo-
ple had neither cash nor valuables to secure a loan. Poor
villagers therefore had limited access to public health care
because, as one government health official admitted, the
user fees were rarely lifted for them and patients were dis-
couraged from presenting because of the multiple costs
incurred:
It's difficult for the poor. In the public hospital they need to
pay a lot...a user fee, bed fee and food, and the child might
still die... Money is a problem during dengue outbreaks ...
I told a client to take the child to hospital. She said no,
because one of her children had already died two days after
admission. She said she'd rather let the child die at home
than take it to hospital. Some people are very poor. When I
refer them, they cry because they have no money and want
to be treated at the health centre, but they can't because the
health centre can't keep people for more than 12 – 20 hours
and the patients need to be referred because I'm afraid of
shock (FGD 30).
Several villagers considered the fees at public health facil-
ities to be a financial barrier to seeking health care from
public health centres in the villages. A mother explained:
One time I took my elder child to the HC. They gave me
medicines, then I said I had no money. One of the staff
members got very angry. I don't dare go there any more,
unless I have money. I went there again when I had 500
riels. I saw the staff member who had been angry with me,
and I couldn't enter the HC (Int 8).
Instead, villagers sought advice locally or in KPC from pri-
vate practitioners who they could pay over time. Although
any treatment involved money, private health practices
provided women with the option to pay by instalment.
While some private practitioners were medically trained,
they were often qualified nurses or midwives who worked
in local HCs and ran small practices from their own house
to supplement their income: that is, they were the same
people who the women would have seen had they pre-
sented at the government centre. The two local practices in
Nekry and Khun were both located on the ground floor of
private houses. The practice room was a simple set-up: a
small cupboard with medicines and other basic supplies –
paracetamol tablets, bags of serum, vitamins, antibiotics,
antiseptic fluid, cotton bandages, cotton wool and strips –
purchased from pharmacies in KPC or Phnom Penh, or
distributed by Cambodian pharmaceutical companies.
The costs of services were the same whether villagers pre-
sented to the private practitioner at home or requested a
house call, and were fairly standard throughout the
region; the consultation, with sufficient medication to last
for 2–3 days, was approximately 2,000 riels. The most
expensive services were for medical injections and serum
perfusions, the latter commonly administered to residents
who believed that it reduced fever and cured disease. Each
injection cost 2,000 riels and each serum perfusion
40,000 riels a litre. Each perfused serum bag was mixed
with injectable drugs, or more often, simply with glucose
or vitamin C, allowing practitioners to charge additional
money again.
In an emergency, as happened if dengue shock syndrome
developed, women often took their child to the provincial
government hospital in KPC:
My son had high fever so I pressed nonongleaves to make
juice for him, then I got peth(doctor) Ek Chun to give for
injections. My son became worse with a higher fever, so my
father in-law told me to take him to the pethin KPC. My
husband told him that we had no money, so my father in-
law gave us 10,000 riels to take my son for a blood test at
the hospital in KPC. The staff told me that my son had
typhoid fever and dengue. He was hospitalized for five days.
When we were discharged, we gave the doctor 30,000 riels.
He accepted only 5,000 riels and returned the rest to us. He
asked us if we had money to return home. My husband said
we had no money, so he gave us the money. I don't knowInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:10 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/10
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why; perhaps he felt sorry for us because my husband is
blind (Int 10).
While this woman received partial exemption, other vil-
lagers faced very large bills. Villagers knew that services
were cheapest at the village HC, and that in KPC, the cost
was lower at public health centres than in mixed private
and public services. But they also knew that if they pre-
sented to the referral hospital, they would have to pay
upfront. In an emergency, they had no time to sell their
belongings or get a loan, but they would often not have
enough money to pay the hospital admission fee and so
would have difficulty getting their child examined and
admitted. Apart from the scheduled fees, most interview-
ees reported having to pay additional costs such bed or
laboratory fees, and to buy medicines, catheters or blood
if these were not available at the hospital. Transport, food,
accommodation and other costs, and lost income, again
influenced decision making. One woman noted:
You need a number at hospital to get to see a doctor. Some-
times we have to wait too long... one of my neighbours spent
a few days (at the children's hospital) and came back
empty-handed ... just waiting for the number, just waited
and waited, and spent one week waiting – then got nothing.
When I heard that – I have no money to wait (Int 26).
These additional costs increased the financial burden for
patients and deterred people from utilizing this facility.
Many people, like the woman who lost three of her five
children, kept their children at home, using home reme-
dies and waiting for the fever to resolve itself when village
treatments failed.
Discussion
All people who participated in this study – villagers whose
children had had dengue fever, and their health providers,
spoke of lack of money recurrently, always returning to
this as they narrated their own and others' stories of ill-
ness, hospitalisation and sometimes death: "No money,
no medicines (Int 23)," one woman explained; another,
"Without money, I daren't go there (hospital) (Int 8); and
another, "It's very difficult when we have no money"
(Int 5).
The fee-exemption rates of 18% and 16% at public health
centres and referral hospitals in Cambodia is relatively
low compared to other developing countries, where
exemption rates range from 20% to 93% [3,27]. In the
study area, in contrast, they were comparatively high, but
as discussed above, exemptions were given not only to the
poor and not necessarily to the poor. Individuals (and
their immediate families) who had work connections
with the facility, and students and monks, were exempted,
but numbers of people who were poor, on any objective
basis, were compelled to pay fees. The health centres and
hospitals had limited incentives to treat poor people free
of charge because they would lose revenue from the fees
and the reimbursement mechanisms were not operating.
The introduction of user fees consequently led service pro-
viders to enforce fees wherever possible, rather than to
ensure access to care as a priority.
As already discussed, given the current poverty status in
Cambodia, people have to sell property or borrow to pay
for health care. The categories of user fees set at the
National Children's Hospital and National Maternal and
Child Health Care were very similar to those operating in
provincial and district levels, with quality of health care
also varying substantively depending on ability to pay.
People with more money could afford better health care
in private air-conditioned rooms; those with less money
received a different standard of health care in a shared
ward; those without had to wait for a fee subsidy from a
non-government organization or the sympathy of some-
one in a health facility. If a family could not afford the
travel costs to take their ill child to the facility, then they
had no option but to keep their child at home, test home
remedies, and wait to see the outcome.
Due to different health seeking behaviours, the costs of
health care met by respondents in Khun and Nekry were
much higher than the average costs of US$11.87 spent by
the population in KPC on health care, although less than
those of villagers in Banteay Meanchey, northwest Cam-
bodia, where medicine and medical treatment were far
more expensive because of the locality of the province in
a cross-border commercial zone. In this area, according to
van Damme and colleagues [17], villagers who used pri-
vate services first, then public ones, paid from US$6 to
US$97 with an average of US$32, 81% of which was paid
in the private sector and the rest at the public hospital.
Despite safety net mechanisms introduced to prevent
inequity, in practice the service fees and the necessary pur-
chase of diagnostic supplies, serum, drugs and other mate-
rials punish the poor. The policy itself aims to raise money
from the poor to finance a health system that tends to
overlook them. With the introduction of fees for public
health care, villagers have had to pay more not less in
direct costs, in addition to indirect costs such as transport
and food, opportunity costs (lost wages), and fees charged
by private practitioners in cases when they used these
before resorting to the public facility. During this period
of delay, while the child is infectious, others in the village
are also at a risk of infection. In this respect the user fees
result in the iatrogenic transmission of dengue fever and
illustrate how "iatrogenic poverty" is induced by the
health system [17,28].International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:10 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/10
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Conclusion
Cambodia suffers the highest infant, child and maternal
mortality in Southeast Asia, and dengue fever continues to
contribute to this. Dengue fever causes substantial out-of-
pocket expenses and creates substantial socio-economic
burdens for families in KPC and elsewhere in Cambodia.
Data from this study indicate that mothers' perceptions of
the cost of health care and the lack of financial resources
result in significant delays in seeking health care [24]. The
data also show that the introduction of the user-fee and
limited application of fee exemptions severely impact on
the utilization of public health facilities. Finally, the direct
and indirect costs of health care aggravate poverty. The
possibility of removing or changing the systems of appli-
cation for user fees is a huge challenge for policy makers,
given their needs also to improve the quality of health
care at public health facilities. If the user-fee is maintained
for income generation, public funds need to be available
and accessible to cover all those who are genuinely poor.
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